Meeting held Lv 3 AFP HQ Thursday 1 August 2002.
(FA Morris partial)
Answers (marked "A") provided by FA Dixon.
RE: Questions for Commissioner Keelty.
"disruption" operation being run from Indonesia.
We have interviews with two people, one Australian and one Indonesian who were heavily involved in the "disruption" operation against people smuggling run by the Indonesian National Police with AFP involvement. It is onethe basis of these two
interviews as well as interviews with the Interpol chief in Indonesia and Immigration officials there that the following questions are based.
1. As part of the disruption operation were understand that five "Special Intelligence Unit" teams were run by INP to deal with
people smuggling in hot spot areas in Indonesia and that these teams received equipment and support from Australia, can the
Commissioner confirm this?
A. The five teams were PST teams there was only one SIU team. Material presented to Certain Maritime Inquiry adequately addresses this issue in detail.
2. Part of the efforts of these police was to attempt to track the departure of vessel by gathering information from crews, informants among the asylum seekers, following buses of asylum seekers, collecting information at departure points, is this accurate?
A. We do not comment on informants or investigation methodology specifically. However, all investigation avenues of
inquiry were pursued. See also Overall comment concerning the allegations made in these questions.
3. According to two interviews, the disruption operation included Indonesian police sabotaging the boats of people smugglers
in Indonesian ports. According to one INP officer, "We did it very carefully with accurate calculation so that the boat will stop
in quite a reachable distance that they could be found by people from nearby islands". The sabotaging of boats included interfering with fuel tanks and engines. What knowledge did Officer Dixon in Indonesia have of this INP operation, were officers
in Canberra, including the Commissioner told of these operations or briefed on them in any verbal or written reports?
A. None. Never heard of these incidents. Never heard any rumours. No.
4. According to one Australian source involved in the operation, the INP also made payments to crew members on these vessels to sabotage the vessels at crew change stops on route to Australia like Roti Island and Krakatau, allowing the crews to be
paid in part by people smugglers and also by the INP. What did Officer Dixon know of these operations and were officers in
Canberra, including the Commissioner told of these operations or briefed on them in any verbal or written form?
A. No knowledge.
Comment: People don't live on Krakatu, there was not PST (INP SIUs) on Roti. Virtually no communications there either, in
fact approx May/June 2002 AFP had to provide satellite telephones. There are only 5 x INP officers there.
5. Was money paid to the informant Kevin Enniss by the APF used to pay crews and/or INP members who participated in
sabotage operations against people smuggling vessels?
A. No. Not at all.
6. Were the sabotage operations discussed between AFP, DIMA (as it was then) and/or PM and C?
7. We have several accounts of two meetings in 2001 that Officer Dixon participated in with other Australian embassy officers, including defence officers and Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock where the issue of sabotaging people smuggling
vessels was raised. Did Officer Dixon raise any concerns either at this meeting with the minister or later to you or any other
senior AFP officers about the issue of sabotaging people smuggling vessels?
A. FA Dixon was not present at any meetings where the issue of sabotaging people smuggling boats was discussed.
8. Was the issue of sabotaging people smuggling vessels ever raised with the AFP's responsible minister?
B. The SIEV X
1. Evidence released to the CMI Senate inquiry indicates an intelligence gathering operation on Abu Quassey had begun at
least as far back as August 2001 by the AFP and DIMA. How concerned was the AFP about Abu Quassay's operation, was he
a target of the joint AFP/DIMA (now DIMIA) strike force?
A. These matters are presently before the court and are subject to sub-judice considerations.
2. Intelligence from the AFP was passed to Coastwatch on October 17 about the departure of this vessel, what precisely did
that report say?
A. These matters are presently before the court and are subject to sub-judice considerations.
3. We have been informed that Officer Dixon, another colleague and Kevin Enniss and INP officers were in West Java at the
time of the SIEV X departure, monitoring various smugglers including Abu Quassey and that information on the departure
was coming directly from an informant involved in Quassey's operation, is this accurate?
A. Mr Enniss was never in West Java. At the time FA Dixon believes he was coming back from West Java looking at the
organisers of a different boat, SIEV 6, which sailed to Ashmore Reef. SIEV X departed Indonesia from across the strait. Mr
Enniss worked in Kupang. The AFP/INP SIU were not monitoring Abu Quassey.
4. We are also informed there was a telephone call from the boat, the SIEV X, to Abu Quassey on the shore shortly after the
departure of the vessel on the early morning of the 18th, this call was reported to the AFP and to the naval attache in Jakarta,
Al Johnson. Was this included in the AFP intelligence reports to DIMA and Coastwatch, if not, why not?
A. The AFP learnt about communications from SIEV X late on the 22nd or early on the 23rd October from survivor reports.
5. We understand two members of the Mandanean community were working as operates for Abu Quassey in gathering passengers for the SIEV X. Some 24 Mandaneans left the boat near the Krakatau Islands regarding the boat as unseaworthy. According to interviews with some of these people, they then returned to Bandar Lampung, the vessel's departure point late on
October 19 and reported to local police there on the SIEV X, and its unseaworthiness. Was this information passed to Officer
Dixon and was it included in the report he telephoned to Coastwatch on the morning of the 20th.
A. The AFP has no knowledge of who worked with/for Abu Quassey.
There was no INP SIU team on East Sumatra and it was never a departure point the reports were never made to the AFP.
6. That call from Dixon was made at 5.30am from Indonesia, what was the urgency of that call? Will the Commissioner brief
us on the contents of that call which was then passed to Joint Intelligence headquarters and Norcom according to Col Gallagher's evidence on July 11 to the Senate inquiry?
A. FA Dixon did not make this telephone call however, the time of call was normal as by that time it was 9:30am in
7. Was the AFP asked to give any information on the two Abu Quassey operatives from the Mandanean community in support
of their refugee applications to a western country?
A. No. FA Dixon has never heard of this.
8. The AFP says it was not aware that the Abu Quassey vessel had sunk until late on the evening of October 22. Yet interviews
with the survivors of SIEV X and the fishing vessel owners clearly indicated the fishermen who picked up survivors contacted
their owners near Bandar Lampung immediately on rescuing the survivors on the morning of October 20. The owners in turn
contacted the INP on that morning of October 20. Was no information passed from the INP to the AFP in Jakarta for two days
about the rescue?
A. No. Delays in INP reporting procedures may have contributed to this delay.
9. Has the AFP any information that anyone, INP or informants or crew sabotaged the SIEV X?
C. On the MOU protcols on people smuggling co-operation being set aside in September 2001.
1. Was the Commissioner informed in Jakarta that concerns about the transparency of the "disruption" operations, payments
made to INP officers and informants by Kevin Enniss, and the sabotage operations played any role in setting aside the protocols for the MOU?
A. No. None of those were reasons. The Protocol was suspended because the Indonesian Government wanted a Government-to-Government level agreement.
2. UNHCR officials have reports from numerous asylum seekers in Indonesian
claiming that Mr Enniss took their money for passages to Australia on people smuggling boats but they did not get those passages. Was this tactic a sanctioned part of the "disruption" operation? Were these moneys used to pay informants and operatives by Mr Enniss?
A. Asylum seekers paid money to Mr Enniss who gave the money to the INP. The AFP managed Mr Enniss, the INP
controlled him. This is the same as an informant taking money from prospective drug purchasers and giving that money to
the police. The drugs are naturally never supplied to the prospective drug purchasers.
Overall comment concerning the allegations made in these questions:
The use of large fishing vessels in the Indonesian waters has ruined the local fishing industry leaving many smaller fishing
boats and crews idle. FA Dixon stated that the AFP and INP SIUs only followed the passengers because there are hundreds of
boats for sale and the crews frequently go with them. The organisers themselves may not know what boats they are going to
buy until shortly before travelling, so it would be impossible to identify a boat in time, if some of the alleged activities were to
be attempted. At times the people smugglers would not identify and purchase a boat until the evening before an intended journey. For these reasons there was never any reason to attempt to pursue the [boats, the people remained the focus of the AFP and INP SIU activities].